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I. INTRODUCTION 
States have concluded thousands of bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) 
in the 1990s that regulate the treatment of foreign investors and their 
investments in the host State where an investment is made.1  These 
investment treaties provide foreign investors with an unprecedented level of 
substantive legal protection over and above the usual protections otherwise 
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Article.  This Article reflects facts current as of September 2009. 
 1. According to United Nations Conference of Trade and Development 
(“UNCTAD”), Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements (2006–June 
2007), IIA MONITOR No. 3, at 2 (2007), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ 
webiteiia20076_en.pdf, there were 2,573 treaties at the end of 2006.  It should also be noted 
that States have also entered a limited number of multilateral investment agreements at the 
regional level, for instance, the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”).  North 
American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA], U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 
(1993). 
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available to them.2  BITs also offer groundbreaking procedural benefits to 
foreign investors by allowing them to submit their disputes with the host 
State directly to an international arbitral tribunal. 
One area of the law on foreign investments where significant new 
developments have occurred in recent decades is the legal standing of 
shareholders of corporations investing abroad to submit claims to arbitral 
tribunals constituted under investment treaties.3  The focus of this Article is 
not to systematically analyse the legal standing of shareholders under these 
treaties.  This question has recently received the attention of several 
scholars,4 including the present Author.5  As summarised by Alexandrov, “it 
is beyond doubt that shareholders have standing in [International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”)] to submit claims separate and 
independent from the claims of the corporation” and “this principle applies 
to all shareholders, no matter whether or not they own the majority of the 
shares or control the corporation.”6  
This Article focuses instead on whether or not any rule of customary 
international law has emerged concerning the protection of shareholders 
and their legal standing before arbitral tribunals.  The first Section offers an 
overview of the legal standing under investment treaties of different actors 
typically involved in foreign investment, including majority and minority 
  
 2. Apart from the legal protection existing under custom, other types of protection 
can also be found in the host State’s legislation on investment, and sometimes, in contracts 
entered into directly between a foreign investor and the host State (or a State-owned entity).  
 3. In this Article, the term “shareholder” is used in its general meaning.  It includes 
both physical persons as well as legal persons (i.e. corporations or partnerships) owning 
shares or other forms of participation in another corporation.  This Article does not intend to 
discuss so-called “portfolio investment,” which includes shares traded on stock markets.  See 
M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 227–28 (2d ed. 2004).  
The other related issue of bondholders will also not be examined; see P. Griffin & A. Farren, 
How ICSID Can Protect Sovereign Bondholders?, 24 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 21 (2005); Michael 
Waibel, Opening Pandora’s Box: Sovereign Bonds in International Arbitration, 101 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 711 (2007).  
 4. See, e.g., Stanimir A. Alexandrov, The “Baby Boom” of Treaty-Based 
Arbitrations and the Jurisdiction of ICSID Tribunals: Shareholders as Investors and 
Jurisdiction Ratione Temporis, 4 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 19 (2005); Christopher 
Schreuer, Shareholder Protection in International Investment Law, 2 TRANSNAT’L DISP. 
MGMT. (2005); F.O. Vicuña, The Protection of Shareholders Under International Law, in 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TODAY: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF OSCAR SCHACHTER 161–70 
(M. Ragazzi ed., 2005); Ian A. Laird, A Community of Destiny: The Barcelona Traction Case 
and the Development of Shareholder Rights to Bring Investment Claims, in INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA, 
BILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 77 (Todd Weiler ed., 2005); R. 
Doak Bishop, Multiple Claimants in Investment Arbitration: Shareholders and Other 
Stakeholders, in MULTIPLE PARTY ACTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 239 (Belinda 
Macmahon ed., 2009).  
 5. M.J. Valasek & Patrick Dumberry, Developments in the Legal Standing of 
Shareholders and Holding Companies in Investor-State Disputes (forthcoming, 2010).  
 6. Alexandrov, supra note 4, at 30. 
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shareholders in corporations investing in the host State.  The second Section 
contrasts the broad legal protection offered to corporations and their 
shareholders under modern investment treaties with the situation that has 
historically prevailed under international law.  The third Section examines 
some authors claim that a new rule of customary international law has 
emerged providing shareholders with a procedural “right” to bring 
arbitration claims against the State where they make the investment.  
In the present Author’s view, no such customary rule has crystallised.  
This is mainly because the scope and extent of legal protection offered to 
corporations and shareholders under BITs are not consistent enough to 
constitute the basis for any custom rule.  There is also no evidence of any 
opinio juris in the context of investment treaties.  Moreover, any such 
customary rule would be contrary to the general principle that corporations 
lack any automatic jus standi before international tribunals in the absence of 
specific State consent.  It would also be contrary to the principle that an 
arbitral tribunal cannot exceed its powers.  
II. LEGAL STANDING OF SHAREHOLDERS UNDER INVESTMENT TREATIES 
As mentioned above, BITs regulate the treatment of one State’s foreign 
investors investing in the other State party to the treaty.7  They provide 
foreign investors with unprecedented level of substantive legal protection.  
These treaties normally provide for equal treatment of domestic and foreign 
investors (the so-called “national treatment” and “most-favoured-nation 
treatment” clauses), a minimum standard of treatment to investors (the 
obligation for the host State to provide a “fair and equitable treatment”) and 
compensation in case of expropriation of an investment by the host State.8  
BITs also offer groundbreaking procedural benefits to foreign investors, 
such as the ability to resolve investment disputes by bringing arbitration 
claims directly against the States in which they invest.  This aspect has 
rightly been described as “one of the most important progressive 
developments in the procedure of international law of the twentieth 
century.”9  In recent years, there has been a remarkable increase in the 
number of international arbitration cases involving disputes between foreign 
  
 7. Valasek & Dumberry, supra note 5.  
 8. W. Salacuse, The Treatification of International Investment Law?, 3 L. & BUS. 
REV. AM. 155. 
 9. Stephen M. Schwebel, The United States 2004 Model Bilateral Investment 
Treaty: An Exercise in the Regressive Development of International Law, 3 TRANSNAT’L 
DISP. MGMT. 2 (2006).  It can be argued that as a result of these changes, corporations can be 
deemed as (derived, limited, relative and functional) “subjects” of international law in the 
context of investor-State arbitration arising from BITs.   See Patrick Dumberry, L’entreprise, 
sujet de droit international? Retour sur la question à la lumière des développements récents 
du droit international des investissements, 108 REV. GENERALE DE DROIT INT’L PUB. 103 
(2004) (Fr.). 
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investors and States under these BITs.  There are currently some 290 known 
investor-State arbitration cases pending.10  
Ultimately, the legal standing of corporations (and their shareholders) to 
submit arbitration claims against the host State depends on the specific 
wording of the applicable legal instrument under which the arbitral tribunal 
is constituted.  Before examining the procedural rights typically available 
for corporations and their shareholders under modern investment treaties, a 
few preliminary observations should be made about basic corporate 
structure and typical investment scenarios under which corporations invest 
in a foreign country.  
The most straightforward option is, of course, that of a direct investment 
by a foreign corporation in the host State.  Another common option involves 
the so-called “parent” corporation making an investment in a foreign 
country through another corporation, its wholly-owned subsidiary.  Arbitral 
tribunals have recognised the right of a parent corporation to bring an 
arbitration claim against the host State for damages sustained by its local 
subsidiary.11  
In many countries, foreign investments are required to be channeled 
through a local corporation incorporated in the State where the investment is 
made.  In general, such a local corporation does not have standing to file an 
arbitration claim against the host State under the ICSID Convention because 
it is not considered as a “foreign” investor.12  As a matter of principle, a 
legal dispute between a local corporation and the host State should be 
settled before the local courts of that country.  However, an exception to 
that principle is set out in Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention which 
allows under specific circumstances claims by local corporations.13  Based 
  
 10. UNCTAD, Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, IIA 
MONITOR No. 1 at 1, UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2008/3 (2008) (based on a draft prepared by 
Federico Ortino).  The statistic highlighted by this source is the most up to date figure as of 
this publication.  As well, there are undoubtedly a large number of other investor-State 
disputes currently being settled by arbitration about which information is not publicly 
available.  This is true for most cases where the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Arbitration Rules and other ad hoc arbitration rules apply. 
 11. Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. 
ARB/81/1, ¶ 24 (Sept. 1983), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 351 (1984). 
 12. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1975, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 160 [hereinafter 
ICSID Convention], was entered into force in 1966, when it had been ratified by twenty State 
members of the World Bank, and established the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (“ICSID”).  The ICSID Convention’s primary aim is the promotion of 
economic development and the facilitation of private international investments through the 
creation of an impartial and reliable system for the settlement of disputes between foreign 
investors and States. 
 13. Int’l Bank for Reconstruction & Dev., Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, at art. 25, ICSID/15 (Oct. 
14, 1966), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-
final.pdf [hereinafter ICSID Convention].  Where the element of foreign control is present, a 
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on the particular circumstances of the case, arbitral tribunals have allowed 
locally-incorporated corporations to bring a claim against the host State.14 
In some other instances, the locally incorporated corporation is not fully-
owned by the “parent” corporation.  Sometimes that local corporation will 
be controlled not by a single corporation, but by several foreign 
corporations or individuals.  In this case, one foreign corporation may hold 
the majority of the shares of the local corporation, while another or several 
others will be a “minority” or non-controlling) shareholder.  Modern BITs 
typically contain a broad definition of the term “investment” that includes 
shares or other forms of participation in corporations within its scope.  In 
such cases, tribunals have had no difficulty accepting that the participation 
by a corporation in a locally-incorporated corporation as an investment that 
is protected under the treaty.  ICSID decisions show that there is no material 
distinction between majority and minority shareholders for jurisdictional 
purposes.  A foreign corporation that is a shareholder with either a 
majority15 or a minority16 participation in a locally-incorporated corporation 
can typically submit a claim before an ICSID arbitral tribunal.  It is also 
recognised in ICSID decisions that the right of a majority or minority 
shareholder to bring a claim is independent of that of the locally-
incorporated corporation.17  In fact, decisions of several ICSID tribunals 
  
locally-incorporated company that possesses the host State’s nationality may nevertheless be 
deemed to be a national of another contracting State and be allowed to submit a claim under 
the Convention provided that two conditions are fulfilled.  Id.  First, Article 25(1) states that 
there must be an agreement with the host State that reflects its undertaking to treat a locally-
incorporated company that is foreign-controlled as a national of the State whose national 
controls the company.  Id.  Such agreement between the parties is usually found in an 
investment treaty or in a contract entered into directly between the foreign investor and the 
host State.  Id.  Second, Article 25(2)(b) states that the locally-incorporated company must 
also be effectively controlled by nationals of another Contracting State.  Id.  In other words, 
the objective element of “foreign control” must be present.  Id. 
 14. See, e.g., Aguas del Tunari et al. v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID (W. Bank) Case 
No. ARB/02/3 (Oct. 2005): Autopista Concesionada de Venez., C.A. v. Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/00/5 (Sept. 2001); see also TSA Spectrum 
de Arg. S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/05/5 (Dec.  2008).  
 15. Antoine Goetz et al. v. Republic of Burundi, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. 
ARB/95/3, ¶ 89 (Feb. 1999); Gas Natural SDG S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. 
Bank) Case No. ARB/03/10 ¶¶ 9, 34 (June 2005). 
 16. Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, 
ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/87/3 (June 1990); see Lanco Int’l, Inc. v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/97/6 (Dec. 1998); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/8 ¶ 47 (July 2003); Enron Corp. & 
Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/3, ¶¶ 44, 
49 (Jan. 2004); Gami Investments, Inc. v. Mexico, ¶ 37, UNCITRAL (Nov. 2004). 
 17. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. & InterAguas Servicios 
Integrales del Agua S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/17, 
¶ 51 (May 2006); Enron, supra note 16, ¶¶ 39, 49. 
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also show that minority and majority shareholders can each submit their 
own distinct claims in connection with the same events.18  
Another slightly more complicated, but common, investment scenario is 
the following: a foreign investor (the “parent” corporation) does not make 
its investment in the host State directly with the locally-incorporated 
corporation, but instead indirectly through another “intermediate” 
corporation (or, sometimes, through several such corporations), which, in 
turn, has an interest in this local corporation.  These intermediate 
corporations are often special-purpose “holding” or “shell” corporations.  
They usually have no significant assets or operations and are established for 
the sole purpose of owning shares of other corporations.19  Arbitral tribunals 
have recognised the right of a foreign investor to submit a claim for 
damages suffered by a local corporation in the host State even if its interest 
in such corporation is held indirectly.20  This right for a foreign investor was 
also recognised by tribunals in cases where the intermediate corporation had 
neither the nationality of the investor nor that of the host State, but the 
nationality of a third State.21  Arbitral tribunals have also recognised the 
right of intermediate (“shell”) corporations to submit their own claims to 
arbitration for damages sustained by the locally-incorporated corporation.22 
In sum, BITs generally define the terms “investor” and “investment” 
very broadly and typically allow a foreign corporation that is a majority or a 
minority shareholder in a local corporation of the host State to submit an 
arbitration claim against that State.  That right has even been recognised for 
investments made in the host State indirectly through one or several 
“intermediate” corporations.  
  
 18. Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. 
ARB/02/16 (May 2005); Camuzzi Int’l S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case 
No. ARB/03/2 (May 2005). 
 19. Intermediate companies will sometimes be incorporated in another jurisdiction to 
benefit from a tax treaty with the host State or for other reasons (for example, the British 
Virgin Islands, Cyprus, the Netherlands, etc.). 
 20. Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/8, ¶ 
137 (Aug. 2004); Société Générale v. Dominican Republic, LCIA Case No. UN 7927 ¶¶ 48, 
51 (Sept. 2008).  The Siemens case involved an intermediate corporation with the same 
nationality as the claimant investor.  Tribunals have also had to decide cases where the 
intermediate corporation had the nationality of the host State of the investment.  See Enron, 
supra note 16.  
 21. Encana Corp. v. Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN 3481 ¶ 115 (Feb. 2006); Waste 
Mgmt. v. United Mex. States, ¶¶ 80, 85, UNCITRAL (Apr. 2004); Azurix Corp. v. Argentine 
Rep., ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/12, ¶¶ 73-74 (Dec. 2003); Ronald S. Lauder v. 
Czech Rep., UNCITRAL (Sept. 2001). 
 22. See Saluka Investments BV (Neth.) v. Czech Rep., ¶ 226, UNCITRAL (Mar. 
2006); ADC Affiliate Ltd. & ADC & ADMC Management Ltd. v. Rep. of Hungary, ICSID 
(W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/16, ¶¶ 357–58 (Oct. 2006); Aguas del Tunari, supra note 14, ¶¶ 
330–32. 
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III. IS THE BARCELONA TRACTION CASE STILL RELEVANT? 
The broad procedural legal protection offered to corporations and their 
shareholders under modern investment treaties contrasts with the situation 
that has historically prevailed under international law.  A good starting point 
to examine the rapid evolution of the rights of shareholders at international 
law is to recall the findings of the now classic Barcelona Traction case 
decided in 1970 by the International Court of Justice (“ICJ” or the “Court”).  
In that case, at issue was whether the Belgian shareholders of Barcelona 
Traction, a Canadian corporation, could have their claim against Spain for 
harm done to the corporation espoused by Belgium.  The Court held that the 
nationality of a corporation is determined by its place of incorporation and 
where it has its registered office. Consequently, Belgium could not espouse 
the claim by Belgian shareholders against Spain.  On the rights of 
shareholders under customary international law, the Court stated that:  
Notwithstanding the separate corporate personality, a wrong done to the 
company frequently causes prejudice to its shareholders. But the mere fact 
that damage is sustained by both company and shareholder does not imply 
that both are entitled to claim compensation. . . .  In such cases, no doubt, 
the interests of the aggrieved are affected, but not their rights. Thus 
whenever a shareholder’s interests are harmed by an act done to the 
company, it is to the latter that he must look to institute appropriate action; 
for although two separate entities may have suffered from the same wrong, 
it is only one entity whose rights have been infringed. 23 
The Court’s holding suggests that foreign shareholders are not entitled to 
any international protection independent from that existing for a corporation 
affected by a wrongful act committed by a State.24  Indeed, one author 
concluded at the time the judgment was rendered that “shareholders are 
powerless under international law, having no effective remedy for their 
injuries.”25  However, it should be emphasised that the Court’s statement 
  
 23. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4, 35 
(Feb. 5,) [hereinafter Barcelona Traction].  The case has been recently “revisited” by authors, 
see G. Sacerdoti, Barcelona Traction Revisited: Foreign-Owned and Controlled Companies 
in International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR 
OF SHABTAI ROSENNE 699–716 (Y. Dinstein ed., 1989); see Lawrence Jahoon Lee, Barcelona 
Traction in the 21st Century: Revisiting its Customary and Policy Underpinnings 35 Years 
Later, 42 STAN. J. INT’L L. 237 (2006); see Laird, supra note 4; see generally Vaughan Lowe, 
Shareholders’ Rights to Control and Manage: From Barcelona Traction to ELSI, in LIBER 
AMICORUM JUDGE SHIGERU ODA 269, 269–84 (Nisuke And  et al. eds., 2002). 
 24. The Court, however, recognized that there are some exceptions to that rule, for 
instance, when the shareholders’ rights are directly affected.  Barcelona Traction, supra note 
23, at 36.  Or when the company has ceased to exist where it is incorporated.  Id. at 40–41. 
 25. P.G. Lutz, Diplomatic Protection of Corporations and Shareholders: Capacity of 
Government to Espouse Claims of Shareholders of a Foreign Corporation, 1 CAL. W. INT’L 
L.J. 148, 148 (1970). 
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was made in the context of diplomatic protection rather than a claim 
brought under an investment protection treaty.  In fact, the Court 
specifically explained that shareholders could have a remedy at international 
law whenever a breach of an investment treaty provision was involved.26  
Today, as explained above, the legal protection for shareholders of 
corporations investing abroad is offered through the existence of a growing 
number of bilateral and multilateral investment treaties.  In the 2007 Diallo 
case, the ICJ recognised that in “contemporary international law” the 
question of the protection of the rights of shareholders is “essentially 
governed” by investment treaties and that “the role of diplomatic protection 
somewhat faded.”27  In other words, investment treaties have generally 
replaced diplomatic protection in terms of legal protection offered to 
corporations and their shareholders investing abroad.28  As a result, it has 
been suggested that “the Barcelona Traction case is no longer applicable or 
instructive as a statement of international law on the protection of foreign 
investment.”29  Similarly, for Vicuña, “[i]t is hardly conceivable that general 
international law might still be identified with the Barcelona Traction 
findings.”30 
In the present Author’s view, the findings of the ICJ in the Barcelona 
Traction case are still pertinent today in the specific context of diplomatic 
protection.31  The Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection adopted in 2006 
by the International Law Commission confirm the classic principle (and its 
exceptions) on the protection of shareholders as set out in Barcelona 
Traction.32  As a matter of principle, the rule remains that “[a] State of 
  
 26. Barcelona Traction, supra note 23, at 47.  Several ICSID tribunals have stated 
expressly that the findings of the ICJ in this case in the context of diplomatic protection are 
not applicable per se in the different context of investor-State disputes under investment 
treaties.  See CMS Gas, supra note 16, ¶¶ 43–44; Suez, Sociedad General, supra note 17, ¶ 
50; Siemens, supra note 20, ¶ 141. 
 27. Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Rep. Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), 
2007 I.C.J. 103, ¶ 88 (May 24).  
 28. David D. Caron, The Nature of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the 
Evolving Structure of International Dispute Resolution, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 104, 154–55 
(1990).  
 29. Laird, supra note 4, at 94.  
 30. Vicuña, supra note 4, at 169.  
 31. See also, Id. at 165, 169.  
 32. Text adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-eighth session, in 
2006, and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering 
the work of that session in Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-first Session, 
Supplement No. 10 (A/61/10) [hereinafter Draft Articles].  It should be noted, however, that 
the Draft Articles adopted a novel approach with respect to the issue of nationality of 
corporations.  Draft Article 9 provides as follows: “For the purposes of the diplomatic 
protection of a corporation, the State of nationality means the State under whose law the 
corporation was incorporated.  However, when the corporation is controlled by nationals of 
another State or States and has no substantial business activities in the State of incorporation, 
and the seat of management and the financial control of the corporation are both located in 
another State, that State shall be regarded as the State of nationality.”  Id. art. 9. 
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nationality of shareholders in a corporation shall not be entitled to exercise 
diplomatic protection in respect of such shareholders in the case of an injury 
to the corporation.”33  To that rule, the Draft Articles provide three 
exceptions.  One such exception is when an internationally wrongful act 
causes a “direct injury to the rights of shareholders,” distinct from those of 
the corporation.34  The fact that the Barcelona Traction ruling remains today 
the statement of the law on the protection of shareholders in the context of 
diplomatic protection35 was recently confirmed by the ICJ in the 2007 
Diallo case.36 
IV. TOWARDS THE EMERGENCE OF A RULE OF CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
Customary international law is one of the sources of international law.37  
The question of what treatment is to be accorded to foreign investors under 
customary international law has been very contentious amongst States for 
decades.  In fact, for many years no broad international consensus emerged 
on the existing legal protection because of persisting differences in 
approach between developed and developing States.38  For a long time the 
  
 33. Id. art. 11.  Article 17 indicates that “[t]he present draft articles do not apply to 
the extent that they are inconsistent with special rules of international law, such as treaty 
provisions for the protection of investments.”  Id. art. 17. 
 34. Id. art. 12.  Under Article 11, the two other exceptions under which the State of 
nationality of shareholders is entitled to exercise diplomatic protection are as follows: (1) 
“[t]he corporation has ceased to exist according to the law of the State of incorporation for a 
reason unrelated to the injury,” (2) “[t]he corporation had, at the date of injury, the 
nationality of the State alleged to be responsible for causing the injury, and incorporation in 
that State was required by it as a precondition for doing business there.”  Id. art. 11(a)–(b).  
 35. C. MACLACHLAN, L. SHORE & M. WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 124 (2007); Vicuña, supra note 4, at 165. 
 36. Diallo, supra note 27, ¶ 87  Where the Court confirmed the rule of customary 
international law that “the right of diplomatic protection of a company belongs to its national 
State.”  In that case, Guinea contended there was one exception to that rule of customary 
international law: “the shareholders of a company can enjoy the diplomatic protection of 
their own national State as regards the national State of the company when that State is 
responsible for an internationally wrongful act against it.”  Id. ¶ 83.  The Court rejected the 
existence, “at least at the present time,” of such a rule of diplomatic protection “by 
substitution.”   Id. ¶ 89.  Interestingly enough, the Court in Barcelona Traction, supra note 
23, at 48 mentioned in its judgment that “a theory has been developed to the effect that the 
State of the shareholders has a right of diplomatic protection when the State whose 
responsibility is invoked is the national State of the company.”  The Court in Barcelona 
Traction, however, stopped short of endorsing this exception by indicating that “whatever the 
validity of this theory may be” it was not applicable to the present circumstances of the case.  
Id.  In Diallo, the Court did not rule on whether or not the “more limited rule of protection by 
substitution” contained at Article 11(b) of the ILC Draft Articles reflects customary 
international law.  Diallo, supra note 25, ¶¶ 91, 93. 
 37. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, (stating 
that “international custom” requires a “general practice” that is “accepted as law.”). 
 38. See Schwebel, supra note 9, at 1.  
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absence of any such consensus prevented the development and 
crystallisation of rules of customary international law in the field of 
international investment law.  The ICJ drew the same conclusion in 1970 in 
the Barcelona Traction case:  
Considering the important developments of the last half-century, the 
growth of foreign investments and the expansion of international activities 
of corporations, in particular of holding companies, which are often 
multinational, and considering the way in which the economic interests of 
states have proliferated, it may at first sight appear surprising that the 
evolution of the law has not gone further and that no generally accepted 
rules in the matter have crystallized on the international plane. 39 
In fact, it is precisely because of this perceived lack of established 
customary principles that States concluded thousands of BITs in the 
1990s.40  
Despite the early lack of consensus, it is undeniable that some principles 
of customary international law have now emerged in the field of 
international investment law.41  For instance, the obligation for the host 
State to provide foreign investors with the “minimum standard of treatment” 
is a customary norm.42  Similarly, the host State cannot expropriate a 
foreign investor’s investment unless four conditions are met: the taking 
must be for a public purpose, as provided by law, conducted in a non-
discriminatory manner and with compensation in return.43  This Section 
examines whether any customary rule has emerged specifically on the legal 
standing of shareholders before arbitral tribunals. 
  
 39. Barcelona Traction, supra note 23, 46–47. 
 40. R. Dolzer & A. von Walter, Fair and Equitable Treatment: Lines of 
Jurisprudence on Customary Law, in INVESTMENT TREATY LAW, CURRENT ISSUES II 99 
(Federico Ortino et al. eds., 2007).  
 41. See Patrick Dumberry, Are BITs Representing the “New” Customary 
International Law in International Investment Law? 28(4) Penn State International Law 
Review, 2010. 
 42. Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States, ¶ 121, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/99/2 
(Oct. 2002) (“[T]he phrase ‘Minimum standard of treatment’ has historically been 
understood as a reference to a minimum standard under customary international law.”); see 
also L. REED ET AL., A GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 48 (2004); IOANA TUDOR, THE FAIR 
AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT 61–62 (2008); OECD, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International 
Investment Law 8 (Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Working Paper No. 
2004/3, 2004). 
 43. Generation Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/00/09, ¶ 
11.3 (Sept. 2003) (stating “[i]t is plain that several of the BIT standards, and the prohibition 
against expropriation in particular, are simply a conventional codification of standards that 
have long existed in customary international law”).  See also Catherine Yannaca-Small, 
“Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right To Regulate” in International Investment Law, 3 
(OECD, Working Paper No. 2004/4, 2004); C. MACLACHLAN, supra note 35, at 16. 
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Because of the proliferation of BITs allowing shareholders to submit 
claims to arbitration, some writers argue that this possibility—which first 
developed as a lex speciali —has now, in fact, become a general rule.44  The 
CMS v. Argentina Tribunal came to the same conclusion:  
The Tribunal therefore finds no bar in current international law to the 
concept of allowing claims by shareholders independently from those of 
the corporation concerned, not even if those shareholders are minority or 
non-controlling shareholders.  Although it is true, as argued by the 
Republic of Argentina, that this is mostly the result of lex specialis and 
specific treaty arrangements that have so allowed, the fact is that lex 
specialis in this respect is so prevalent that it can now be considered the 
general rule, certainly in respect of foreign investments and increasingly 
in respect of other matters.  To the extent that customary international law 
or generally the traditional law of international claims might have 
followed a different approach—a proposition that is open to debate—then 
that approach can be considered the exception.45 
This statement could be interpreted as suggesting that a rule of 
customary international law on the protection of shareholders has actually 
crystallised as a result of the large number of BITs containing comparable 
definitions of “investment” or “investor” and the fairly consistent 
interpretation of those BITs by arbitral tribunals.  However, it is important 
to note that in the subsequent case of Camuzzi v. Argentina another Tribunal 
(with Professor Vicuña acting as president just like in the CMS case) 
clarified the meaning of the above-mentioned CMS dictum, suggesting that 
no custom had in fact emerged:   
In CMS, the tribunal held that the system of treaties on protection gives 
rise to a lex specialis which “can now be considered the general rule, 
certainly in respect of foreign investments and international claims . . . .”
 
However, this does not necessarily mean that it refers to the emergence of 
a customary rule.  The general rule is evidenced by the fact that practically 
all disputes relating to foreign investments are today submitted to 
arbitration by resorting to the mechanisms of that lex specialis, as 
expressed by means of bilateral or multilateral treaties or other 
agreements.  Only in very exceptional instances do the affected parties 
resort to diplomatic protection; the latter cannot then be considered the 
general rule in the system of international law presently governing the 
matter, but as a residual mechanism available when the affected individual 
has no direct channel to claim on its own right.46  
  
 44. C. MACLACHLAN, supra note 35, at 186. 
 45. CMS Gas, supra note 16, ¶ 48 (emphasis added).  
 46. Camuzzi, supra note 18, ¶ 145 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).  
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One writer nevertheless argues in favour of the emergence of a new rule 
of customary international law with respect to shareholders’ procedural 
rights to bring arbitration claims against the State where they make an 
investment. 
[W]ith the recent exponential development and growth of international 
investment treaties and related jurisprudence since the ELSI case, a 
reasonable argument can be now made that we have reached that tipping 
point at which a general rule of international law, as evidenced in state 
practice motivated by opinio juris, can be said to have emerged with 
respect to shareholders’ rights to bring claims.47  
For him, “a strong argument can now be made that sufficient consistency 
does exist in investment instruments and related jurisprudence, and that this 
particular area of international law has evolved to reflect a new and 
consistent state of international custom.”48  The same position also seems to 
have been adopted by Lowenfeld, for whom the “understanding . . . that 
disputes between foreign investors and host State should be subjected to 
impartial adjudication or arbitration [is] a general principle[] and do[es] not 
depend on the wording or indeed the existence of any given treaty.”49 
Such statements are part of a larger debate in doctrine about the impact 
that 2,500 BITs have had on the development of customary international 
law in general.50  Some writers have recently argued that BITs represent the 
“new” customary international law.  This is the position of Judge Schwebel, 
who stated, “when BITs prescribe treating the foreign investor in 
accordance with customary international law, they should be understood to 
mean the standard of international law embodied in the terms of some two 
thousand concordant BITs.”51  This seems also to be the position of 
  
 47. Laird, supra note 4, at 86 (emphasis added). 
 48. Id. at 96 (emphasis added).  
 49. ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 586 (Oxford 
University Press, 2d ed. 2008) (emphasis added). 
 50. Stephen M. Schwebel, Investor-State Disputes and the Development of 
International Law: The Influence of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Customary 
International Law, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 27–30 (2004); see also Steffen Hindelang, 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, Custom and a Healthy Investment Climate: The Question of 
Whether BITs Influence Customary International Law Revisited, 5 J. WORLD INVEST. & 
TRADE 789 (2004); see Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements and International 
Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 123 (2003); Bernard Kishoiyian, The Utility of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties in the Formation of Customary Int’l Law, 14 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 327 
(1994); see generally Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: 
Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639 (1998); 
Abdullah Al Faruque, Creating Customary International Law Through Bilateral Investment 
Treaties: A Critical Appraisal, 44 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 292 (2004); Tarcisio Gazzini, The Role 
of Customary International Law in the Protection of Foreign Investment, 8 J. WORLD INVEST. 
& TRADE 691 (2007). 
 51. Schwebel, supra note 50, at 29–30. 
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Lowenfeld, “taken together, the [BITs] are now evidence of customary 
international law, applicable even when a given situation or controversy is 
not explicitly governed by a treaty.”52  In other words, for these writers the 
content of custom would simply be the same as that of these numerous 
BITs.  The present Author has explained elsewhere why the proposition 
equalling custom and BITs should be rejected.53  
V. A REBUTTAL TO THE PROPOSITION THAT ANY CUSTOMARY RULE HAS 
DEVELOPED 
In the present Author’s view, no rule of customary international law on 
the legal standing of shareholders before arbitral tribunals has crystallised. 
This is essentially for three reasons.  First, the main weakness of the 
proposition that any such “rule” has emerged is that the purported rule does 
not meet the definition of customary international law.  Second, the 
practical consequences of recognising the existence of such a rule would be 
contrary to the well-known principle that corporations (just like individuals) 
lack any automatic jus standi before international tribunals to contest a 
violation of international law in the absence of specific State consent.  
Third, the practical consequences of recognising such a rule would also be 
contrary to the principle that an arbitral tribunal is limited by the wording of 
the BIT under which it is constituted. 
A. BITs Are Missing the Two Necessary Elements of Customary 
International Law 
Custom has two constitutive elements: a “constant and uniform” (but not 
necessarily unanimous) practice of States in their international relations and 
the belief that such practice is required by law (opinio juris).54  This double 
requirement is one of the most well-established principles of international 
law.55  It is constantly applied by tribunals in the context of investor-State 
arbitration.56  These two requirements will now be examined in turn. 
  
 52. LOWENFELD, supra note 49, 584 (emphasis added); Lowenfeld, supra note 50, 
123–30. 
 53. See Dumberry, supra note 41 (arguing that BITs are missing the two necessary 
elements of customary international law, but that BITs will nevertheless necessarily 
influence custom: they will contribute to the consolidation of already existing custom rules 
and will also contribute to the crystallisation of new rules of custom in the future). 
 54. Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary 
International Law, International Law Association, Final Report 8 (2000). 
 55. See, e.g., Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J., 13, ¶ 27 (June 3). 
 56. United Parcel Serv. of Am. v. Gov’t. of Canada, ¶ 84, UNCITRAL (Nov. 2002).  
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1. The Lack of Consistent State Practice 
The first basic requirement of custom is proof of consistent State 
practice.57  This is particularly true in the context of BITs where rapidly 
increasing State practice is a rather recent phenomenon that accelerated only 
in the 1990s.  As explained by the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf 
case, State practice must be “both extensive and virtually uniform” where it 
is asserted that a rule of customary international law has emerged in a short 
period of time.58  As mentioned above, modern investment treaties typically 
define the term “investment” very broadly to encompass shares in 
corporations.  The term “investor” is also usually defined in broad terms.  
There remain, however, some important inconsistencies between BITs 
with respect to how they specifically define “investor” and the nationality of 
corporations.59  This is important because nationality is the gateway to legal 
protection under an investment treaty.60  The scope of the definition of what 
is considered an “investor” under a BIT determines if a corporation and its 
shareholders receive any protection under that treaty.  In other words, the 
legal standing of a shareholder and its access to arbitration always depends 
on whether or not it fits into the definition of “investor” under a specific 
treaty.  
A recent study of BITs entered into by countries of the Americas 
highlights the great inconsistency in the definitions of corporate 
nationality.61  Out of forty BITs examined, the author found no less than 
five different definitions of “investor”: five treaties defined nationality of a 
corporation solely based on incorporation; fifteen required incorporation 
plus the seat of management; nine required incorporation, seat of 
management, and effective economic activities; ten allowed claims based 
on incorporation plus the seat of management or economic activities; and 
finally, only one treaty required incorporation and control.  In other words, 
what is an “investor” under these BITs really depends on the exact wording 
of each treaty.  Clearly, no general standard exists in the Americas.  
The same is also true for the rest of the world.  Some treaties require that 
a corporation be not only incorporated in a party State, but that its effective 
management (such as its headquarters) also be located there.62  Other 
  
 57. This section is largely drawn from Dumberry, supra note 41. 
 58. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Denmark), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 75 (Feb. 20).  
 59. Gazzini, supra note 50, 709; see also R. DOLZER & M. STEVENS, BILATERAL 
INVESTMENT TREATIES, 34 (1995); Kishoiyian, supra note 50, at 346–53. 
 60. Anthony C. Sinclair, The Substance of Nationality Requirements in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration, 20 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 357 (2005); Pia Acconci, Determining 
the Internationally Relevant Link between a State and a Corporate Investor, Recent Trends 
Concerning the Application of the ‘Genuine Link’ Test, 5 WORLD INV. & TRADE 139 (2004). 
 61. Lee, supra note 23, 272–73. 
 62. Sinclair, supra note 60, at 374 (discussing examples and referring specifically to 
the U.K.-Philippines BIT and the Italy-Libya BIT).  
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treaties further require that the corporation be controlled by nationals of the 
State of incorporation or have substantial business activities in that State.63  
At the other extreme, some BITs entered into by the Netherlands extend 
protection to legal entities not even incorporated in that country provided 
that they are controlled by Dutch nationals.64  These are clear examples of 
State practice not consistent enough to form the basis of any customary rule. 
In fact, completely different approaches are sometimes adopted by the 
same country depending on the treaty.  A good illustration is Canada’s 
position concerning holding corporations.  Most BITs entered into by 
Canada provide that a corporation is considered “Canadian” under the treaty 
if it is “incorporated or duly constituted in accordance with applicable laws 
of Canada.”65  A holding corporation incorporated in Canada would 
therefore be covered under these treaties.  However, other BITs require that 
a corporation also be “controlled” (either directly or indirectly) by Canadian 
nationals.66  The same requirement is found in the Model BIT adopted by 
Canada, which requires that a corporation have “substantial business 
activities” in Canada to be considered Canadian.67  Shell corporations 
incorporated in Canada that do not meet these requirements are therefore 
not protected under these treaties.  Other inconsistencies also exist in BITs 
entered into by Canada concerning protection to “indirect” shareholders.68 
In sum, the scope and extent of protection offered under BITs to 
corporations and shareholders greatly varies.  Indeed, there is no general 
standard on the legal standing of corporation and their access to 
international arbitration.  The existence of this procedural right ultimately 
depends on the exact wording of each treaty.  No standardised solution 
exists in BITs.  The variegated State practice is certainly not consistent 
  
 63. See, e.g., the United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2004) [hereinafter 
U.S. Model BIT]; Canadian Model Foreign Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement 
(2004) [hereinafter Canada Model BIT].    
 64. For instance, the Netherlands-Bulgaria BIT, discussed in Sinclair, supra note 60, 
at 368.  
 65. Canada Model BIT, supra note 63. 
 66. See, for instance, the BITs entered into by Canada with Hungary and Costa Rica.  
 67. Canada Model BIT, supra note 63, art. 18.  The same rule is found in NAFTA at 
art. 1113(2) and in the recent Canada-Peru BIT at art. 18.  
 68. Most of Canada’s BITs define “investment” as any kind of asset invested by a 
Canadian company in the territory of the other party “either directly, or indirectly through an 
investor of a third State.”  Canada Model BIT, supra note 63 (emphasis added).  However, 
an earlier BIT entered into with Poland in 1990 does not make explicit reference to “indirect” 
investments.  Also, although the Canada-Hungary BIT does refer to “indirect participation,” 
it does not explicitly refer to the possibility of such participation being made through a 
company incorporated in a third State.  The issue of indirect claims is discussed in Markus 
Perkams, Piercing the Corporate Veil in International Investment Agreements: The Issue of 
Indirect Shareholder Claims Reloaded, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW IN CONTEXT 93 
(A. Reinish & C. Knahr, eds., 2008).  
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enough to constitute the basis for any rule of customary international law 
concerning shareholders’ rights.69  
2. BITs Lack any Opinio Juris 
The second requirement for custom is opinio juris.70  As explained by 
Schachter, “the repetition of common clauses in bilateral treaties does not 
create or support an inference that those clauses express customary law” 
because “[t]o sustain such a claim of custom one would have to show that 
apart from the treaty itself, the rules in the clauses are considered 
obligatory.”71  There is no evidence of any opinio juris in the context of 
investment treaties.72  As the UPS Tribunal stated, “while [BITs] are large 
in number their coverage is limited; and . . . in terms of opinio juris there is 
no indication that they reflect a general sense of obligation.”73  In fact, the 
evidence suggests that States enter into BITs solely based on their perceived 
economic interest.  
As explained by one writer, “a BIT between a developed and a 
developing country is founded on a grand bargain: a promise of protection 
of capital in return for the prospect of more capital in the future.”74  Guzman 
convincingly concludes that it is “simply not possible to explain the 
paradoxical behaviour of [less developed countries] toward foreign 
investment based on a view that BITs reflect opinio juris” as these BITs “do 
not reflect a sense of legal obligation but are rather the result of countries 
using the international tools at their disposal to pursue their economic 
  
 69. See also SORNARAJAH, supra note 3, at 232 (“The absence of uniformity of 
approach in the several bilateral investment treaties to the problem of protecting companies 
again indicates that they cannot provide the basis upon which common principles or 
customary law can evolve on the issues of corporate nationality and shareholder protection in 
international law.  They merely represent a consensus of opinion as between the two parties 
to the agreement as to such issue.”); see also Kishoiyian, supra note 50, at 352; Gazzini, 
supra note 50, at 707–10. 
 70. This section is largely drawn from Dumberry, supra note 41. 
 71. Oscar Schachter, Compensation for Expropriation, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 121, 126 
(1984) (emphasis added).  
 72. In North Sea Continental Shelf, the Court explains that “Not only must the acts 
concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a 
way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of 
a rule of law requiring it.  The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective 
element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis.  The States 
concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal 
obligation.  The frequency, or even habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough.”  
North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 58, ¶ 77. 
 73. UPS, supra note 56, ¶ 97.  
 74. J.W. Salacuse, The Treatification of International Investment Law?, 3 L. & BUS. 
REV. AM. 155, 159 (2007) (emphasis added); see also J.W. Salacuse & N.P. Sullivan, Do 
BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 
46 HARV. INT’L L.J.  67 (2005).  
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interests.”75  Ultimately, BITs are the result of trade-offs and mutual 
concessions between States.  Their content depends on the political and 
economic bargaining power of each party to the negotiations.76  BITs are the 
result of a compromise between conflicting interests; they are not entered 
into by States based on any perceived legal obligation. 
B. Corporations Lack any Automatic Jus Standi Before International 
Tribunals in the Absence of State Consent 
The unlikelihood of the emergence of any rule of customary international 
law on the legal right of shareholders to bring claims to international 
arbitration is clear when one considers the practical consequences of the 
recognition of the existence of such a rule.  
Such a procedural customary “rule” would be binding on all States, even 
those that have not entered into any BITs.  The “rule” could therefore be 
invoked by any foreign investor irrespective of whether or not its State of 
origin has entered into a BIT with the country where it made its investment.  
In practical terms, this would mean that any corporation investing anywhere 
in the world could rely on such a “rule” for legal protection and have access 
to international arbitration to settle disputes with the host State.  
Such an outcome would be contrary to one of the most fundamental 
tenets of international law.  At the heart of international law remains the 
principle that corporations (just like individuals) lack any automatic jus 
standi before international tribunals to contest a violation of international 
law.  Their standing to submit claims against States directly before 
international judicial bodies does not exist without the consent of the State 
against which a claim is submitted.77  In other words, corporations do not 
have direct access to international tribunals in the absence of a specific 
instrument providing for such access.78  There is, indeed, no presumption of 
jus standi of corporations (and their shareholders) before an international 
tribunal.  
  
 75. Guzman, supra note 50, at 687.  
 76. See OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 303 
(1991); see also Kishoiyian, supra note 50, at 333. 
 77. Such consent by the State can be found in BITs or other treaties, in the 
investment legislation of the host State or in a direct investment agreement between a 
corporation and the host State.  
 78. It should be noted that many older BITs do not offer investors (or shareholders) 
any right to commence direct arbitration proceedings against the host State of the investment; 
they only provide for a State-to-State dispute settlement mechanism.  This is certainly the 
case for many BITs of the 1960s before the creation of ICSID (in 1965).  See Agreement 
Between the Federated Republic of Germany and the Federation of Malaysia Concerning the 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, F.R.G.-Malay., Dec. 22, 1960, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_malaysia.pdf; see DOLZER & 
STEVENS, supra note 59, at 119. 
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In contemporary international law the procedural capacity of individuals 
(and corporations) to submit claims against States directly before 
international judicial bodies remains the exception and not the rule.79  This 
is so even though an increasingly important number of tribunals and courts 
of an international nature do provide for such direct access for individuals.  
Apart from a few rather marginal examples at the turn of last century,80 it 
should be noted that direct access for individuals (and corporations) to 
international tribunals existed in treaties following the First81 and Second 
World Wars.82  Since then other tribunals or commissions have been created 
at the end of international conflicts to deal with claims by individuals or 
corporations, including the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal,83 the U.N. 
Compensation Commission,84 and more recently the Ethiopian-Eritrea 
claims commission.85  Another category of international tribunals providing 
individuals with the procedural capacity to file claims against States are 
those created by international treaties for the protection of human rights.86 
  
 79. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 59, at 119 (“This type of provision [i.e. those 
providing for the settlement of disputes between investors and States] is unusual in treaty 
practice insofar as it accords private parties the right to pursue claims under an international 
treaty.”); see also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 585 (5th ed., 
1998) (“[T]he assumption of the classical law that only states have procedural capacity is still 
dominant and affects the content of most treaties providing for the settlement of disputes 
which raise questions of state responsibility, in spite of the fact that frequently the claims 
presented are in respect of losses suffered by individuals and private corporations.”). 
 80. Convention for the Establishment of a Central American Court of Justice, Dec. 
20, 1907, 206 C.T.S. 78 (functioning for only 10 years); Convention Respecting the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land [1907 Hague Convention IV], Oct. 18, 1907, Annex, 36 Stat. 
2277 (setting up an International Prize Court, but since the treaty was never ratified, the court 
only existed on paper). 
 81. Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, T.S. No. 4, 2 Bevans 43, art. 297 (allowing 
nationals of the Allied and Associated Power to submit claims against Germany before 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunals established under Article 304 of the Treaty).  
 82. Supreme Restitution Court established by the Convention on the Settlement of 
Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation [Bonn Convention], May 26, 1952 (as 
amended by Schedule IV to the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954), 6 U.S.T. 5652, 5670, 
T.I.A.S. 3425. 
 83. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of 
Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran art. II, ¶ 1, Jan. 19, 1981, 20 
I.L.M. 223, 230 [hereinafter Claims Settlement Declaration]. 
 84. S.C. Res. 692 (20 May 1991) implementing S.C. Res. 687 (3 April 1991) and the 
Secretary-General’s Report (2 May 1991, S/22559).  
 85. Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea, Eth.-Erit., June 
18, 2000, 2138 U.N.T.S. 86; Agreement Between the Government of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea, Eth.-Erit., Dec. 12, 2000, 
2138 U.N.T.S. 94. 
 86. The most important convention providing direct access for individual to an 
international court is no doubt the Protocol No. 11 oft November 1, 1998 to the European 
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In the area of international investment law, despite the proliferation of 
BITs, the legal standing of corporations and their shareholders to bring 
claims to international arbitration remains even today the exception rather 
than the general rule.  However numerous BITs may be (more than 2,500), 
it remains that they certainly do not cover the whole spectrum of possible 
bilateral treaty relationship between States.  According to one writer, BITs 
in fact only cover some 13% of the total bilateral relationships between 
States worldwide.87  For instance, Canada has entered into BITs with only 
twenty-four countries,88 while the United States has entered into forty such 
treaties.89  In other words, more often than not a corporation making an 
investment in another country does not benefit from the substantive and 
procedural rights typically contained in a BIT.  In most cases, foreign 
investors doing business abroad do not have direct access to international 
arbitration under an investment treaty.90 
For most scholars, the right to international adjudication existing under 
modern BITs has simply not crystallised to become a rule of customary 
international law binding on all States and available for all foreign 
investors.91  For instance, Judge Schwebel states:  
In view of the treaty-specific nature of grants of international adjudication, 
and the presumption that States are not amenable to international 
adjudication unless they consent to it, it would not be tenable to suggest 
that BIT provisions that afford arbitral recourse have themselves found 
their way into the body of customary international law.92  
The rule of customary international law remains that “[s]tates are not 
subject to international claims by private parties without their express 
consent.”93  
In sum, it is one thing to say that under modern BITs, “shareholder rights 
to bring international claims have become the norm rather than the 
  
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 
213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 87. Gazzini, supra note 50, at 691. 
 88. See Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/index.aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).  
 89. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).  
 90. For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that so-called State contracts, 
between States and investors (whether corporations or individuals), are also a recognized 
mechanism by which a corporation may have direct access to an international arbitral 
tribunal. 
 91. Kishoiyian, supra note 50, at 368; C. MACLACHLAN, supra note 35, at 11, 17; 
Gazzini, supra note 50, 707–10. 
 92. Schwebel, supra note 50, at 30. 
 93. Gus van Harten, Judicial Supervision of NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitration: Public 
or Private Law?, 21 ARB.  INT’L 493, 505 (2005).  
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exception.”94  It is quite another to argue that a rule of customary 
international law has emerged on the jus standi of shareholders before 
international tribunals.  In the present Author’s view, no such rule exists.  
C. An Arbitral Tribunal Cannot Exceed its Powers  
It seems appropriate to mention at this juncture another practical 
consequence of recognising a rule of customary international law on the 
legal right of shareholders to bring claims to international arbitration.  Such 
a “rule” would not only be beneficial for foreign investors deprived of any 
treaty protection, but also for those that are covered by investment treaties.  
Thus, any shareholder faced with an unfavourable treaty provision could 
simply invoke such customary “rule” before an arbitral tribunal constituted 
under that treaty.  For instance, such a rule could be invoked by an investor 
when faced with a BIT not providing any protection for “indirect” 
investment made through intermediary corporations, or a BIT not covering 
“minority” (non-controlling) shareholders.  Similarly, any holding company 
could invoke the “rule” even if it does not qualify as an investor under a 
BIT requiring that the corporation be controlled by nationals of one State 
and have “substantial business activities” in that State.  In other words, a 
shareholder’s “right” to have access to international arbitration could always 
be “saved” by customary international law despite the existence of 
incompatible treaty language.  
In the present Author’s view, this would be contrary to the principle that 
the power of an arbitral tribunal is limited by the wording of the BIT under 
which it is constituted.  In fact, a “[t]ribunal cannot read more into [a] BIT 
than one can discern from its plain text.”95  As explained by the Saluka 
Tribunal, “it is not open to [a] [t]ribunal to add other requirements [in a 
BIT] which the parties could themselves have added but which they omitted 
to add.”96  In other words, it is clearly not for a tribunal to cure any 
perceived treaty “defect” in terms of shareholders protection.  No arbitral 
tribunal has yet taken the liberty to accord any procedural rights to 
shareholders based on customary international law despite clear treaty 
provision to the contrary.  Arguably, any tribunal doing so would go beyond 
its power. 
  
 94. Laird, supra note 4, at 86.  
 95. ADC, supra note 22, ¶ 359.  
 96. Saluka, supra note 22, ¶ 241; see also Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Romania, ICSID 
(W. Bank) Case No. ARB/06/3, ¶ 85 (Apr. 2008).  
  The Tribunal would in any case have great difficulty in an approach that was 
tantamount to setting aside the clear language agreed upon by the treaty Parties in favour of a 
wide-ranging policy discussion. Such an approach could not be reconciled with Article 31 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (which lays down the basic rules universally 
applied for the interpretation of treaties), according to which the primary element of 
interpretation is “the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty.” 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The legal protection offered to shareholders under international law has 
rapidly evolved in the last decades.  However important these new 
developments may be, no rule of customary international law providing 
corporations and their shareholders with an automatic right to submit 
arbitration claims before international tribunals has yet crystallised.  
Ultimately, it matters little that no such rule has yet emerged. The impact 
of numerous BITs offering greater procedural and substantive rights to 
corporations and shareholders resonates in other ways.  The very existence 
of these BITs has had an impact on the treatment received by all investors, 
not just those covered by BITs.  Thus, as a result of broad BIT language 
usually allowing claims by indirect and intermediate corporations, it is 
becoming increasingly difficult for a host State to know whether or not a 
certain investment is covered by a BIT.97  For one writer, “it should be 
assumed [by the host State] that an investor of a party to an investment 
treaty may be ultimately owned by an investor of a non-state party, or by an 
investor of the host state itself.”98  Consequently, host States must assume 
the existence of such BIT protection and, therefore, treat all investors 
according to standards of protection typically offered under such treaties.  
As explained by Legum:  
Under these circumstances, the only way to comply with the treaty is for 
the host state to assume that all investors—all companies—are covered by 
the highest standards of any BIT in force for the state.  The reality that 
foreign capital is highly fungible and the breadth of the definitions of 
investor and investment thus combine effectively to transform the facially 
bilateral obligations of the BIT into an obligation that the host state must 
consider potentially applicable to all investors.99 
  
 97. Barton Legum, Defining Investment and Investor: Who is Entitled to Claim? 22 
ARB. INT’L 524 (2006). 
  [U]nder normal circumstances, host state officials will never know at the time 
they must take action whether a given company is covered by a given treaty.  Where a host 
state has entered into BITs that cover indirectly controlled investments, there could be 
between one and 20 or more layers of intermediate holding companies that separate the 
company the host state officials see and the company which is a covered investor under the 
treaty.  The covered investor could itself, in fact, be an intermediate holding company, with 
the ultimate parent company publicly traded or controlled by third country nationals.  A 
lower level official reviewing a permit application (just like a minister reviewing a bid 
proposal of national importance) will not normally have access to information concerning the 
nationality of intermediate holding companies in the applicant’s corporate hierarchy. 
Id.  
 98. GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 115 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2007).  
 99. Legum, supra note 97 at 524; see also K.J. Vandevelde, International Decision: 
Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 179 (2007).  
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The policy implication of the global network of BITs is therefore that a 
higher threshold of treatment is increasingly being offered to all foreign 
investors and their investments. 
 
